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ANTIMASK LAWS: EXPLORING THE OUTER BOUNDS OF
PROTECTED SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT-
State v. Miller 260 Ga. 669, 398 S.E.2d 547 (1990)
Abstract" In State v. Miller, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the Georgia Anti-
mask Statute does not violate free speech rights under the first amendment of the United
States Constitution. Antimask statutes prohibit, with certain exceptions, the wearing of
masks in a public place. The stated purposes of these statutes vary, but it is fairly clear
that antimask laws are designed to deter Ku Klux Klan activity. This Note explores the
first amendment implications of antimask laws, and concludes that antimask statutes are
unconstitutional.
On February 28, 1990, Shade Miller was arrested for wearing a Ku
Klux Klan mask in public in violation of the Georgia Antimask Stat-
ute.' Miller challenged the constitutionality of the statute, claiming,
among other things, that it violated his free speech rights. The ensu-
ing litigation, in which the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the con-
stitutionality of the statute,2 raised a troublesome question: to what
extent should racial hate speech be protected under the first
amendment?
Courts have struggled with this problem numerous times in the
past.3 In Collin v. Smith,4 the town of Skokie, Illinois, sought to pre-
vent the Nazi party from marching and displaying the swastika in
their town. Skokie is a village with a large Jewish population, includ-
ing a significant number of Holocaust survivors.5 Despite the emo-
tional and controversial circumstances in which this case took place,
the federal appellate court struck down ordinances passed by Skokie
officials that would have prevented the Nazis from marching.6
Collin is a good example of the outer limits of first amendment pro-
tection. The speech involved raises the question whether first amend-
ment justifications are strong enough to warrant protecting vicious
racial hate speech.7 The speech involved in State v. Miller' likewise
1. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text for a more detailed account of the facts. See
infra note 62 for the full text of the Georgia Antimask Act.
2. State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 398 S.E.2d 547 (1990).
3. See, eg., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (finding a group libel statute
constitutional as applied to racially hateful speech).
4. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
5. Id. at 1199.
6. Id. at 1210.
7. One commentator has characterized the Skokie events as an "easy case." Bollinger, The
Skokie Legacy: Reflections on an "Easy Case" and Free Speech Theory, 80 MICH. L. REv. 617
(1982). Professor Bollinger argues that expansive protection for free speech is an important tool
for instilling tolerance in listeners. Id. at 630-31.
8. 260 Ga. 669, 398 S.E.2d 547 (1990).
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raises doubts as to how far first amendment protection should extend.
This Note summarizes the relevant first amendment law, and then
addresses the previous use of antimask laws. This Note then explores
the constitutionality of the Georgia Antimask statute.
I. A FIRST AMENDMENT OVERVIEW
The first amendment of the United States Constitution protects free-
dom of speech and association.' Speech includes traditional means of
expression, such as verbal and written communication, as well as sym-
bolic conduct.1o A threshold determination when addressing symbolic
speech is whether the conduct is sufficiently communicative to warrant
first amendment protection. Symbolic speech is subject to first amend-
ment scrutiny if the actor intended to convey a message, and the likeli-
hood is great that viewers would understand the message.1'
Association in the first amendment context is usually predicated on
membership in a group that exists to advance "beliefs and ideas."' 2
Neither speech nor association need be political to fall within the first
amendment's protection,13 although most commentators agree that
the framers were concerned with protecting political speech.14
The first amendment does not protect speech and association abso-
lutely. In appropriate situations, the government may restrict or regu-
late first amendment rights.' 5 However, government faces a heavy
burden to justify abridging its citizens' rights, especially when govern-
ment seeks to regulate the content of speech.1
6
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble." The first amendment is
applicable to the states through incorporation in the fourteenth amendment. See, eg., Fiske v.
Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927).
10. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (burning a United States flag was
held to be symbolic speech protected under the first amendment).
11. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (per curiam) (hanging a United
States flag upside-down in an apartment window with a peace symbol taped on it was
constitutionally protected speech). See also Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404.
12. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
13. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976) (state could not prohibit pharmacists from disseminating the prices of
prescription drugs); N.A.A.C.P., 357 U.S. at 460-61.
14. See generally Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 3-35 (1941).
15. For example, in public places government may reasonably restrict the time, place and
manner of expression. See infra, notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (restrictions related to the content of
speech are subject to the "most exacting scrutiny").
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A. Restricting First Amendment Rights
There are two categories of free speech restrictions.'" First, govern-
ment may attempt to regulate speech in order to suppress certain ideas
or information. Such regulations are known as content-based restric-
tions because they have a direct impact on a particular viewpoint or
subject.'8 Second, government can incidentally restrict expression
through regulations designed to further goals unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free speech. These types of regulations are known as content-
neutral.' 9
1. Content-Based Versus Content-Neutral Restrictions: Why the
Distinction is Important
Distinguishing between content-based and content-neutral restric-
tions of speech is important because courts apply a lower level of scru-
tiny to content-neutral restrictions. Content-based restrictions are
unconstitutional unless the speech at issue falls within a narrowly
defined exception such as fighting words.20 A content-neutral restric-
tion, on the other hand, is constitutional if the restriction furthers a
substantial government interest, and there are no less restrictive alter-
natives available.2 '
When a statute incorporates a restriction on speech, the constitu-
tionality of the statute depends greatly on the statute's plain language.
Courts find statutes unconstitutional if the statutes facially restrict
expression on the basis of content,22 unless the speech at issue is
unprotected.23 A statute may be facially neutral but motivated by
desire to censor expression based on viewpoint or subject matter. Nev-
ertheless, when analyzing the free speech clause, courts almost never
find legislation to be unconstitutional because of improper legislative
motive.24
17. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTONAL LAW § 12-2, at 789-90 (2d ed. 1988); Ely,
Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment
Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1496-1502 (1975).
18. See L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 12-3, at 794-95.
19. See id, § 12-23, at 977-78.
20. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
22. See, eag., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (a school district could
not prohibit students from wearing armbands in opposition to the Vietnam War).
23. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text for representative examples.
24. See, eg., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (the Court found that a
statute prohibiting draft-card burning was facially neutral and refused to address whether the
statute was motivated by a desire to stifle free expression). But see United States v. Eichman, 110
S. CL 2404, 2408-09 (1990) (the Court struck down the facially neutral Flag Protection Act
1141
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An apparently content-based statute may be content-neutral if the
restriction on speech is targeted at the "secondary effects" of speech.
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,25 the Court considered
the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that restricted the location
of adult theaters to a small portion of town.26 The Court held that the
ordinance was content-neutral, because it did not target the content of
the films shown by adult theaters.27 Rather, the ordinance targeted
the secondary effects that adult theaters have on the surrounding com-
munity.28 Thus, secondary effects analysis may save a facially con-
tent-based restriction of expression.29
2. First Amendment Analysis of Content-Based and Content-Neutral
Restrictions
a. Content-Based Restrictions
Content-based regulations target the subject matter or viewpoint of
a message. Restrictions aimed at the content of a communication
must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling government inter-
est.30  A content-based restriction is unconstitutional unless it falls
within one of a few narrow exceptions. Representative exceptions
include: (1) political speech that incites imminent lawless action and
despite the neutral wording of the statute because the government's interest was related to the
content of expression).
25. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
26. The ordinance limited adult theaters to slightly more than 5% of the City of Renton. Id.
at 53-54. The ordinance provided that adult theaters may not be located within 1000 feet of any
residential neighborhood. Id. at 43.
27. Id. at 48.
28. These secondary effects included increased crime, diminution of property values, and
diminished quality of urban life. Id.
29. The Court considered secondary effects analysis again in Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312
(1988). In Boos, the Court struck down a District of Columbia statute prohibiting the display of
signs critical or disrespectful of a foreign government within 500 feet of that government's
embassy. Id. at 329. The Court distinguished Renton, because the regulation in Boos focused on
the direct impact of speech on an audience rather than the secondary effects of speech. Id. at
320-21. Nevertheless, secondary effects analysis endures after Boo
30. E.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980).
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likely will produce such action,31 (2) fighting words,32 (3) libel,33 and
(4) offensive or indecent speech.34
b. Content-Neutral Restrictions
Content-neutral regulations restrict speech without reference to the
message of the speaker, and are thus analyzed at a lower level of scru-
tiny.35  Content-neutral statutes that restrict expression in public
places are commonly referred to as time, place or manner restrictions.
A time, place or manner restriction is constitutional if it furthers a
significant government interest, the interest is unrelated to the content
of free expression, and ample alternative channels for the communica-
tion of information are left open.3 6
31. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969) (per curiam) (a state cannot
prosecute Ku Klux Klansmen for making extremely derogatory remarks about blacks and Jews
where the Klansmen did not incite imminent lawless action).
32. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Fighting words are not
protected under the first amendment. Only speech that directly tends to cause violent acts by the
person to whom, individually, the statement is addressed can be abridged. Ia at 573.
33. Libel is not protected by the first amendment, and the Supreme Court has held that libel
directed against defined groups could be subject to criminal sanctions. See Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). In Beauharnais the Court reasoned that if libel directed against an
individual could be criminalized, the same libelous statement directed against a defined group
can be punished. Ia at 258.
Although Beauharnais has not expressly been overruled, subsequent cases have narrowed its
scope. See eg., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (narrowing the
scope of libel laws by, among other things, adopting an actual malice standard for libel against
public officials). Although the Court has never expressly overruled Beauharnais, legal scholars
continue to debate its validity. Compare F.S. HAP"MN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY
92 (1981) (Beauharnais has been "unhinged") with Lasson, Racial Defamation as Free Speech:
Abusing the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. HUM. Rrs. L. REv. 11, 32 (1985) (arguing that
"Beauharnais is still good law").
34. Some members of the Supreme Court have indicated that offensive or indecent speech
may be subject to less first amendment protection than other speech, but not exempt from
protection entirely. Yet this proposition has never commanded a majority of the Court. See
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., IlI S. Ct. 2456, 2460 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., announced the
opinion of the court and was joined by Kennedy, and O'Connor, JJ. in stating that nude, erotic
dancing "is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we
view it as only marginally so."); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 742-48 (1978) (Stevens,
J., announced the opinion of the Court and was joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J. in
stating that offensive speech should receive less than full protection when broadcasted over the
radio); Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 69-71 (1976) (plurality opinion by
Stevens, 3., joined by Burger, CJ., and White and Rehnquist, JJ. stating that movies that are
indecent, but not obscene, could be subject to less first amendment scrutiny than other forms of
speech).
35. Eg., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 791 (1989).
36. Id; Clark v. Community For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). If a
content-neutral restriction does not affect expression in a public place, then government need
only show a rational justification for the regulation. See, eg., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840
(1976).
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A government may assert at least two interests in regulating the use
of public places with regard to antimask statutes. First, a government
may seek to protect the listener from communications that the listener
would rather not see or hear.37 Nevertheless, a court recognizes this
interest only when the audience can be considered "captive," for
example, when the individual is in their own home.38 Outside these
situations, a person's interest in being left alone is almost always infer-
ior to first amendment rights.39
Second, government may regulate speech in order to avoid violent
audience response to the speaker's message. However, the mere threat
of hostile audience reaction is not a sufficient rationale for the suppres-
sion of expression.' Expression can be restricted on these grounds
only if uncontrollable civil disorder is likely.4
B. Antimask Statutes and Statutory Norms
Antimask statutes vary in form and coverage. Some antimask stat-
utes make mask-wearing, with some exceptions,42 a crime.43 Other
antimask statutes criminalize mask-wearing only if the wearer intends
to intimidate or deprive people of their rights.4 Still other statutes
37. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding ordinance prohibiting the use
of loudspeakers attached to vehicles to emit loud and raucous noises).
38. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting
the picketing of individual residences on the grounds that the resident is captive in his or her own
home).
39. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (people offended by Cohen's jacket,
which had "Fuck the Draft" written across the back, could simply avert their eyes).
40. See Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (conviction of protesters for disorderly
conduct absent any evidence that they had become unruly was unconstitutional).
41. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (defendant could be charged with disorderly
conduct because his street comer speech was a threat to public safety).
42. Common exceptions referred to in antimask statutes include wearing a mask for
Halloween, for masquerade balls, for theatrical productions, for safety while engaging in sporting
or occupational activities, and for Mardi Gras.
43. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-9 (1982) (congregating in public while masked constitutes
loitering); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-38 (1988); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.628 (Callaghan 1990);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.735 (West 1987); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 39.240.35 (McKinney 1989)
(wearing mask in public constitutes loitering); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-12.7-11 (1989) (allows
members of organizations to wear masks if prior permission is obtained from municipality or
county in which the activity will take place); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1301 (West 1983); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-422 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 61-6-22 (1989).
44. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-58 (West 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-37a
(West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1301 (1987) (wearing mask with intent to deprive a
person of rights, privileges or immunities constitutes disorderly conduct); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-
3112.3 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 44.876.12-16 (West 1976 and Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-17-309 (1990 Supp.).
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impose greater criminal penalties on people who commit crimes while
wearing masks.4'
There are relatively few reported cases involving antimask stat-
utes." The stated purposes of antimask statutes vary,47 but there is
general agreement that antimask statutes are aimed at the Ku Klux
Klan.41 The statutes have been applied, however, to activity unrelated
to the Klan." Antimask statutes have been upheld in some states,5"
but have been found unconstitutional in others. 1
Antimask statutes have been found constitutionally infirm in two
respects. First, antimask statutes are subject to challenge on over-
breadth or vagueness grounds.5 2 A statute is overbroad if it substan-
tially restricts constitutionally protected speech along with
unprotected speech and conduct, and is not susceptible to a limiting
construction.53 Under the due process clause, a statute is unconstitu-
45. See, e-g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 46.775.0845 (West Supp. 1991); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265,
§ 17 (Law. Co-op. 1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-3-2, 30-3-9, 30-22-22 (1978).
46. See Annotation, Validity and Construction of State Statute or Ordinance Prohibiting
Picketing, Parading, Demonstrating, or Appearing in Public While Masked or Disguised, 2 A.L.R.
4TH 1241 (1980) (bound volume and supplement list only 12 cases). This does not necessarily
mean however, that they have not been effective. The presence of antimask statutes on the books
may be a deterrent to Klan activity.
47. Compare State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 672, 398 S.E.2d 547, 550 (1990) (purpose of statute
is to protect people of Georgia from masked vigilantes) with Pineville v. Marshall, 222 Ky. 4, 299
S.W. 1072 (1927) (antimask statute is an appropriate crime prevention measure because it
facilitates the identification of robbers and pickpockets).
48. See Miller, 260 Ga. at 678, 398 S.E.2d at 554 (dissenting opinion, stating that the purpose
of the statute is to "unmask the Ku Klux Klan"); Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speeck
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2374 (1989).
49. Eg., Garcia v. State, 443 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Crim. 1969) (court reversed conviction of man
dressed in women's clothing under antimask statute).
50. See, eg., Miller, 260 Ga. at 270, 398 S.E.2d at 549.
51. See Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (antimask statute violated free
speech clause as applied to defendant); Ghafari v. Municipal Court for San Francisco Judicial
Dist., 87 Cal. App. 3d 255, 150 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1978) (antimask statute held to be
unconstitutionally overbroad, vague, and violative of equal protection clause); Robinson v. State,
393 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 1981) (statute could be applied to entirely innocent activities and thus was
an unconstitutional denial of due process). The Florida legislature, in response to Robinson,
amended the Florida antimask statute to require that a mask be worn with intent to.intimidate or
to deprive a person of rights before criminal conduct has taken place. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 44.876.155 (West Supp. 1991). The constitutionality of this amended antimask statute has not
yet been challenged.
52. See Robinson, 393 So.2d at 1077 (overbreadth); Ghafar 87 Cal. App. 3d at 260-65, 150
Cal. Rptr. at 815-18 (1978) (overbreadth and vagueness).
53. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613-15 (1973). The Court stated that the
overbreadth must be substantial in relation to the statute's legitimate sweep. Id. at 615.
The overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the principle that a litigant does not have standing
to challenge the constitutionality of a statute based on potential or hypothetical applications not
before a court. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610-11. The justification for the exception is that the
1145
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tionally vague if its scope cannot be ascertained by a person of average
intelligence.54
Second, antimask statutes have been challenged as content-neutral
regulations that are insufficiently related to government interests, or
not narrowly tailored to further those interests.55 For example, in
Aryan v. Mackey,5 6 the court found that the government interest in
preventing the violence that may erupt from anonymous protests was
substantial. Furthermore, the interest was unrelated to speech because
it was concerned with the possibility of violence without reference to
the message of the mask-wearer.5 Nevertheless, the antimask regula-
tion was unconstitutional because there was no nexus between the
restriction on speech and the asserted interest.5" In addition, antimask
statutes can be viewed as content-based because most antimask stat-
utes contain exceptions for certain mask-wearing conduct that is
arguably expressive.59
C. A Case Study: State v. Miller
1. The Facts
On February 27, 1990, an anonymous caller told the Gwinnett
County Police that a masked Klansperson would appear at the County
Courthouse in Lawrenceville the next day, in violation of the law.'
Shade Miller appeared the next day as scheduled, put on a hood and
mask, and was arrested.6 The police charged him with violating the
Georgia Antimask Statute.62 Miller pleaded not guilty. The trial
statute's existence may cause others to refrain from exercising their first amendment rights. Id
at 612.
54. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974) (statute imposing criminal sanctions on
anyone who treats the United States flag with "contempt" struck down as void for vagueness).
55. See Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Tex. 1978). Aryan involved the prosecution
of Iranian demonstrators who protested against the Shah. They wore masks because they feared
reprisals from the Iranian government. Id. at 92.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 93-94.
58. Id. at 94.
59. The Georgia Antimask Act contains typical exceptions. See infra note 62.
60. N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1990, § 1, at 12, col. 4.
61. Id., Dec. 6, 1990, at B16, col. 3.
62. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-38 (1982). The statute provides that:
(a) A person is guilty of a misdemeanor when he wears a mask, hood, or device by
which any portion of the face is so hidden, concealed, or covered as to conceal the identity of
1146
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court, in an unpublished opinion, held that the Georgia Antimask
Statute was unconstitutional.63
2. Supreme Court of Georgia Holding
The state appealed and the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed. 4
Miller raised two first amendment arguments on appeal. 65  First, he
argued that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him because
it abridged his free speech rights. 6 Second, he contended that the
statute was overbroad, and thus constitutionally infirm.67
The court rejected Miller's argument that his free speech rights
were abridged .6  First the court found that the government had a sub-
stantial interest in regulating the use of masks because crimes of vio-
lence and intimidation were associated with wearing masks.69 Second,
the court determined that the government's interest in regulating mask
use was unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and thus the
statute was content-neutral. 70 The court observed that the statute
only restricted threats and intimidation, which are not protected by
the first amendment.71 Finally, the court determined that the scope of
the statute was no greater than necessary to further the government's
interest.72 The court reasoned that the incidental restriction on speech
the wearer and is upon any public way or public property or upon the private property of
another without the written permission of the owner or occupier of the property to do so.
(b) This Code section shall not apply to:
(1) A person wearing a traditional holiday costume on the occasion of the holiday;
(2) A person lawfully engaged in trade or employment or in a sporting activity where a
mask is worn for the purpose of ensuring the physical safety of the wearer, or because of the
nature of the occupation, trade, or profession, or sporting activity;
(3) A person using a mask in a theatrical production including use in Mardi gras
celebrations and masquerade balls; or
(4) A person wearing a gas mask prescribed in emergency management drills and
exercises or emergencies.
63. N.Y. Times, May 25, 1990, § 1, at 8, col. 4.
64. State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 398 S.E.2d 547 (1990). The court did not clearly predicate
its decision on state constitutional grounds. Thus, the United States Supreme Court could take
review. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
65. Although Miller argued that the antimask statute violated both the United States and the
Georgia constitutions, Miller 260 Ga. at 669-70, 398 S.E.2d at 349, this Note is limited to
analysis of the issues arising under the United States Constitution.
66. Miller, 260 Ga. at 670, 398 S.E.2d at 549.
67. Id. at 669, 398 S.E.2d at 549.
68. The court assumed, without actually deciding the issue, that mask-wearing was
sufficiently expressive to implicate the first amendment. Id at 671 n.2, 398 S.E.2d at 550 n.2.
69. Id at 672, 398 S.E.2d at 550-51.
70. Id at 673, 398 S.E.2d at 551.
71. Id
72. Id
1147
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was de minimis because Miller could still engage in various types of
expressive activity so long as he was not masked.73
The court similarly rejected Miller's overbreadth argument. The
court narrowed the scope of the statute by construing it to apply only
to mask-wearing that provokes a "reasonable apprehension of intimi-
dation, threats or violence."' 74 So construed, the court found that the
statute was not overbroad.75
The lone dissenting judge took issue with the majority view that the
statute was content-neutral. 76 In asserting that the purpose of the stat-
ute was "unmasking the Klan,"' 77 the dissent noted that it was not
enforced against masked criminals generally, but only against a dissi-
dent group.78 The dissent argued that the statute was motivated by
the government's disagreement with the Klan's message. As such, it
should have been found unconstitutional as a content-based restriction
on expression.79
II. FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY OF ANTIMASK LAWS
The Miller court erred in holding that antimask statutes are consti-
tutional.8 o The court should have analyzed antimask statutes as a con-
tent-based rather than a content-neutral restriction. Moreover, the
court came to the wrong result under content-neutral analysis.
Although a government has a strong interest in protecting people from
violence or intimidation at the hands of the Klan, there are less restric-
tive alternatives to antimask statutes. Antimask statutes should be
abandoned in favor of more direct, effective methods of curtailing
racial violence.
A. Is Wearing a Klan Mask Expression Sufficient to Implicate the
First Amendment?
Before determining whether antimask statutes violate the first
amendment, one must decide if wearing a mask is expressive enough
to implicate the free speech clause at all. The Miller court assumed for
73. Id.
74. Id. at 674, 398 S.E.2d at 552.
75. Id. The court also dismissed Miller's freedom of association and equal protection
arguments. Id. at 674-76, 398 S.E.2d at 552-53. This Note is limited to Miller's free speech and
overbreadth claims.
76. Id. at 677-78, 398 S.E.2d at 554-55 (Smith, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 678, 398 S.E.2d at 554.
78. Id. at 678, 398 S.E.2d at 555.
79. Id. at 681, 398 S.E.2d at 557.
80. The following analysis is not only applicable to the Georgia Antimask Act, but also to
similar statutes in other states. See supra note 43.
1148
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the sake of argument that the first amendment applied."1 The diffi-
culty in resolving this question lies in the fact that wearing a Klan
mask serves a number of purposes, not all of them communicative. A
Klansperson could wear a mask for at least four reasons: (1) to intimi-
date others; (2) to avoid being identified while committing a crime; (3)
to avoid being identified for fear that he or she will be persecuted for
unpopular beliefs; and (4) to communicate a particular idea-a hatred
of particular religious and racial minorities or opposition to the anti-
mask laws.
The first two reasons for wearing a mask pose little problem in
terms of first amendment analysis. They are not related to the exercise
of free speech. However, the third and fourth reasons for wearing a
mask are at least related to expression, and they are sufficient to impli-
cate the first amendment.
Although the first amendment does not expressly confer a right of
anonymity, serious first amendment questions arise if a denial of ano-
nymity is tantamount to a denial of first amendment rights.8 2 It is
difficult to resolve this question with regard to the Klan. On the one
hand, the Klan has a history of violence and brutality. It may seem
ironic to allow the Klan to argue that without anonymity they will be
persecuted because their beliefs involve the persecution of other
groups. On the other hand, the Klan is widely disliked, and it is con-
ceivable that a Klansperson could suffer retribution for making his or
her affiliation known to the public.
The Klan mask is also symbolic speech because it communicates an
idea, however contemptible, of racial hatred and inferiority. The two-
part test for determining whether symbolic speech is expressive
enough to implicate the first amendment is whether there'is an intent
to convey a message and whether there is a great likelihood that a
viewer would understand the message.8 3 Miller passes the first part of
the test because he was protesting against the Antimask Act and
asserting his admittedly unpopular views as to race relations. Miller
also passes the second part of the test. A person viewing someone
wearing a Klan mask may think that the mask-wearer is trying to
intimidate others or avoid identification. These reasons for wearing a
81. Miller, 260 Ga. at 671 n.2, 398 S.E.2d at 550 n.2.
82. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (striking down an ordinance requiring
handbills to carry name and address of the sponsor); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958) (N.A.A.C.P. could not be compelled to disclose membership lists absent a sufficient
government interest).
83. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (per curiam). See also Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
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mask do not implicate the first amendment. However, most viewers
understand the notorious history of the Ku Klux Klan, and the views
that the Klan regalia-including the mask-represent.
It is at least as easy to understand the message of the Klan mask as
it is to understand the message in cases involving flag desecration. For
example, in Texas v. Johnson,84 the defendant burned a flag in Dallas
during the 1984 Republican Party convention.8 ' Flag burning in this
context conveys a hatred of the United States in general, and perhaps a
hatred of the Republican Party, or Ronald Reagan, in particular.
Nevertheless, the Court stated that "[t]he expressive, overtly political
nature of this conduct was both intentional and overwhelmingly
apparent."86 Wearing a Klan mask is similar to burning a flag in that
a viewer understands the message that the actor is trying to convey.
Thus, antimask statutes such as Georgia's implicate the first
amendment.
B. First Amendment Analysis of Antimask Statutes
1. Are Antimask Statutes Content-Based or Content-Neutral?
A court must determine whether an antimask statute is content-
based or content-neutral. This requires analysis of the government
interest involved, and whether that interest is related to the suppres-
sion of free speech. The court in Miller accurately states the govern-
ment's interest. People should be protected from the Klan when it
engages in criminal activity.87
Whether the government interest is related to the suppression of
free expression is a more difficult question. The Miller court's posi-
tion, that the statute was content-neutral because it proscribes a cer-
tain form of conduct without reference to the message of the mask-
wearer, is questionable. Antimask statutes such as Georgia's usually
contain certain exceptions that may be considered worthy of first
amendment protection, suggesting that the statutes are content-based.
Like other antimask statutes, the Georgia statute permits wearing a
traditional holiday costume on the occasion of the holiday.88
Although wearing masks on Halloween may be considered amusement
rather than serious expression of an idea, the choice of costume,
including the mask, may involve elements of expression. This is espe-
84. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
85. Id. at 399.
86. Id. at 406.
87. See State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 672, 398 S.E.2d 547, 550-51 (1990).
88. See supra note 62 for the text of the Georgia statute. See supra notes 42-59 and
accompanying text for a discussion of antimask statutes in general.
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cially the case when the mask-wearer chooses to appear as a famous
political figure or celebrity. 9
Moreover, strong elements of expression are present when an actor
dons a mask for a theatrical production. A mask can be an invaluable
aid for a performer to convey an idea or feeling to his or her audi-
ence.90 Literature, as well as theatrical and cinematic productions, is
fully protected under the first amendment. 9' Thus, the antimask acts
give preference to certain forms of expressive mask-wearing conduct
over others, and as such, are content-based. 92
The Miller court did not address whether it is the idea that the Klan
mask represents-racial hatred and intolerance-that created fear and
discomfort for the people of Georgia. Courts have previously had dif-
ficulty in resolving this type of question. For example, in Collin v.
Smith,93 the court discussed whether display of the swastika in a
predominantly Jewish town was protected under the first amend-
ment.94 The court acknowledged the extreme emotional effects that
display of the swastika would have on some viewers.95 Nevertheless,
the court, recognizing that displaying the swastika and other Nazi
regalia was a form of expression, struck down an ordinance prohibit-
ing the dissemination of materials promoting hatred towards persons
based on heritage.96
The Klan mask is symbolic speech that rivals the infamy of the
swastika. Because the Klan mask represents racial intolerance, a pro-
hibition of masks is related to the content of the Klan's message, and
thus subject to the more intense scrutiny afforded to content-based
restrictions on expression.
Furthermore, the legislative history of antimask statutes indicates
that they were enacted in response to organizations like the Ku Klux
Klan.97 The Miller court acknowledged this, but found the Georgia
statute to be content-neutral for two reasons. First, the statute was
89. Consider as a hypothetical protesters who wore grim reaper costumes with George Bush
masks to protest the United States' war with Iraq.
90. Masks were effectively used in cinematic and theatrical productions such as "The
Elephant Man," and "Phantom of the Opera."
91. See, ag., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (the movie "Carnal Knowledge" could
not be banned because no jury could find that the film was legally obscene).
92. An antimask act that does not make exceptions would be content-neutral. However, such
a statute would encounter serious overbreadth and vagueness problems. See supra notes 52-54
and accompanying text for a discussion of overbreadth and vagueness.
93. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
94. Id. at 1201-10.
95. Id. at 1200.
96. Id. at 1210.
97. See State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 672, 398 S.E.2d 547, 550-51 (1990).
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passed for the purpose of protecting the people from the violent activ-
ity of the Klan, not to keep Klanspersons from expressing their points
of view.9 8 Second, even if the legislative motive is improper, that can-
not be used to strike down an otherwise constitutional enactment. 99
The first rationale is problematic because the statute is not closely
related to the legislative objective. Under the statute, a Klansperson
could as easily be convicted for wearing a mask while participating in
a peaceful demonstration as he or she could be for wearing a mask
while committing violent criminal acts. The statute has the appear-
ance of censoring a particular viewpoint because the statute criminal-
izes the wearing of masks without regard to whether the mask-wearer
is engaged in peaceful or violent activity.
The second rationale is less problematic because courts are
extremely reluctant to strike down a facially constitutional law. A
court will invalidate such a statute only when the stated purpose for
passing the law is clearly a pretext for discrimination based on con-
tent.1°° The asserted purpose for enacting antimask laws is not, how-
ever, a pretext. Although antimask statutes have a broad sweep, the
purpose of protecting the people of Georgia from terrorization by
masked vigilantes is within that sweep.101 Even if one of the motiva-
tions behind these statutes is censoring the views of the Klan, an
equally compelling motive is protecting people from violent acts com-
mitted by Klan members. As a result, Miller is distinguishable from
United States v. Eichman, to2 in which the Court found no content-
neutral justification for the Flag Preservation Act. The legislative
motive behind the antimask laws is thus not constitutionally suspect.
A final factor to consider is whether antimask statutes are aimed at
the secondary effects of mask-wearing conduct, rather than the
message that wearing a mask might convey. 103 In City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 1  the United States Supreme Court charac-
terized as content-neutral a zoning ordinance that greatly restricted
the location of adult theaters. Although the ordinance seemed to treat
adult theaters differently from other types of theaters, the Court rea-
soned that the ordinance was not content-based because the aim of the
ordinance was to reduce crime and prevent the diminution of property
98. Id.
99. Id. at 672 n.3, 398 S.E.2d at 551 n.3.
100. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
101. See Miller, 260 Ga. at 672, 398 S.E.2d at 550-51.
102. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990). See supra note 24.
103. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text (discussing secondary effects).
104. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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values."' 5 According to the Court, the government interest was there-
fore unrelated to censoring the content of films shown in adult
theaters. 06
Miller is distinguishable from Renton. If the purposes of an anti-
mask statute is not related to the message a mask conveys, then it
should be analyzed as a content-neutral restriction on free speech. As
stated earlier, the Klan mask conveys a message of racial hatred and
intolerance. The effects that government wishes to avoid are feelings
of fear and intimidation on the part of viewers. The government inter-
est is directly related to the message that the.mask conveys because
government is concerned about the reaction of the viewer on seeing
the Klan mask. As such, it is targeted at the primary effects of the
Klan's message.
Miller is more analogous to Boos v. Barry. 1 7 In Boos, the Court
struck down a statute prohibiting, within 500 feet of a foreign
embassy, the display of signs that were critical of that foreign govern-
ment. The Court stated that restrictions that focus on the direct
impact of speech on its audience are different than the types of secon-
dary effects referred to in Renton. Because the regulation in Boos
targeted the direct impact of a particular category of speech, it was
struck down as a content-based restriction on speech.10 8 Antimask
statutes also target the direct impact of speech on an audience. The
government interest in prohibiting mask-wearing is focused on the
emotional response that the sight of a Klan mask engenders. There-
fore, antimask statutes, like the ordinance at issue in Boos, should be
analyzed as a content-based restriction.
2. Antimask Statutes are Unconstitutional as Content-Based
Restrictions
A court should find that antimask statutes are content-based, pri-
marily because they permit certain types of expressive mask-wearing,
and prohibit others. After finding that a statute is content-based, the
court must determine whether the statute falls within the few nar-
rowly defined areas of speech that are unprotected. The unprotected
areas of speech that are conceivably, relevant to antimask laws are: (1)
imminent incitement to lawless action, (2) fighting words, (3) group
105. Id at 48.
106. Renton has been the subject of much scholarly criticism. Taken to an extreme,
secondary effects analysis could seriously erode first amendment rights. See, ag., L. TRIBE,
supra note 17, § 12-3, at 798 n.17.
107. 485 U.S. 312 (1988). See supra note 29.
108. Id at 321.
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libel, and (4) offensive or indecent speech. " Antimask statutes such
as Georgia's do not fall within any of these exceptions.
Enforcement of the Antimask Act, especially as applied to Miller,
cannot be justified as preventing imminent lawless action. 1 0 One can
imagine situations in which wearing a Klan mask would incite immi-
nent lawless action, but the circumstances surrounding Miller's arrest
are not among them. To be constitutional under this standard, a law
must distinguish between advocacy and incitement." The Georgia
Antimask Act fails to make this distinction because it is equally as
applicable to peaceful activity as it is to situations verging on civil
disorder.
The fighting words exception to first amendment protection is also
inapplicable to enforcement of antimask statutes." 2 Fighting words
have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to
whom, individually, the remark is addressed. Wearing a Klan mask
insults racial groups as a whole, not designated individuals. For the
fighting words exception to be applicable, the words must be addressed
to a particular individual, not a group. Therefore, the fighting words
exception, unless expanded to cover groups, cannot be used to validate
the antimask laws.
Group libel, assuming it is still a viable exception to first amend-
ment protection, might be a sufficient rationale for upholding the con-
stitutionality of antimask laws.' " The question is whether wearing a
Klan mask fits within the definition of libel. To the extent that the
Klan mask can be viewed as conveying a message that the wearer
believes that racial minorities are inferior, this theory may be success-
ful under Beauharnais v. Illinois.114 However, subsequent cases cast
serious doubt on the validity of Beauharnais and group libel theory. 5
Finally, the racist message conveyed by Klan masks may be viewed
as offensive, and thus entitled to a lower level of protection than other
forms of speech under the first amendment." 6 But a majority of the
Court has not yet accepted the notion that offensive speech is entitled
to any less protection than other forms of constitutionally protected
109. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing these unprotected areas of
expression).
110. See supra note 31 (discussing incitement to imminent lawless action).
111. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
112. See supra note 32 (discussing fighting words).
113. See supra notes 33 (discussing group libel).
114. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
115. See supra note 33.
116. See supra note 34 (discussing indecent and offensive speech).
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speech.I 17 In F C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 118 Justice Stevens, joined
by Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, argued for the plurality that
offensive speech could be regulated in some situations as a nuisance. 119
Yet the plurality emphasized the narrowness of their holding, noting
that under the nuisance rationale, the context in which the offensive
message was conveyed was all-important.' Thus, a number of fac-
tors, including the time of day, composition of the audience, and the
method in which the message was transmitted, were relevant to
whether the offensive speech could be regulated.
Applying the standard set forth by the plurality in Pacifica, the
Georgia statute is unconstitutional as applied to Miller. Wearing a
Klan mask is a nuisance or worse in many situations. However, there
are some situations- peaceful demonstrations, for example-in which
wearing a mask cannot be considered as a nuisance. Antimask stat-
utes fail to distinguish between situations in which wearing a mask is a
nuisance and in which wearing a mask is the expression of an idea.
Miller wore his mask in a peaceful demonstration, so he was not creat-
ing a "nuisance" under Pacifica. Therefore, antimask statutes are
unconstitutional as applied to the facts of Miller.
The Supreme Court of Georgia's limiting construction 2' does not
help make the statute constitutional when analyzed as a content-based
restriction on offensive expression. Under the court's construction,
Miller could only be convicted for wearing a mask if he knew or
should have known that his conduct would intimidate onlookers.1
22
However, wearing a Klan mask could be intimidating under any cir-
cumstances, even peaceful demonstrations. The intimidation standard
encompasses too much expressive conduct that should be protected by
the first amendment. It can be used to silence those with opinions that
society views as shocking or abhorrent even when the opinion is
expressed peacefully.
Of course, there are circumstances in which the sight of a Klan
mask would make a bystander reluctant to exercise his or her civil
rights. This is the point at which wearing a mask ceases to be expres-
sion and becomes a threat.'2 3 There is a subtle but important differ-
117. See supra note 34.
118. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
119. Id at 750-51.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
122. State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 674, 398 S.E.2d 547, 552 (1990).
123. For example, a masked Klansperson demonstrating peacefully in a public park should be
entitled to first amendment protection. However, the same masked Klansperson in front of a
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ence between mask-wearing as expression and mask-wearing with
intent to deprive another of his or her rights. Conceivably, a witness
may feel shocked or intimidated by the sight of a Klan mask, yet not
hesitate to exercise his or her civil rights. Under this analysis, the
context in which the mask is worn becomes important.
3. Antimask Statutes are Unconstitutional as Content-Neutral
Restrictions
Even if antimask statutes are analyzed as content-neutral, they are
still unconstitutional. On finding a regulation of expression to be con-
tent-neutral, a court must first determine whether the incidental
restriction on free speech promotes a substantial government interest.
If the government interest is substantial, then a court must determine
if there are equally effective alternatives that are less speech-
restrictive. 124
a. The Government Interest
Content-neutral rationales for restricting speech are not persuasive
in the context of antimask statutes. The government interest in pro-
tecting the unwilling listener from the intrusive speaker is strong
enough to outweigh the first amendment only when the audience is
captive or at home. For example, in Cohen v. California,'25 the
Supreme Court held that the defendant could not be prosecuted under
a disorderly conduct statute for wearing in a public courthouse a
jacket with "Fuck the Draft" written across the back. The Court rea-
soned that persons offended by the jacket could avert their eyes, and
that the right of Cohen to express his views outweighed the rights of
bystanders not to be offended. 26 If people offended by a Klan mask
worn in public can avert their eyes to avoid the source of the offense,
then under Cohen, the rights of the mask-wearer outweigh the rights
of the viewer.
Neither can antimask laws be justified by the government interest in
averting civil disorder resulting from the views of an unpopular
speaker. Although the government interest in preventing civil disor-
der is strong, this interest cannot be used as a pretext for silencing the
polling place on election day should not be protected under the first amendment because of the
likelihood that some people would be reluctant to exercise their right to vote.
124. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-99 (1989). The Court in Ward
stressed that government need not find the least restrictive method of restricting speech,
especially if that alternative would promote the government's interest less effectively. Id.
125. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
126. Id. at 22.
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opinions of an unpopular minority.127 A showing must be made that
civil disorder is imminent and cannot be prevented by the law enforce-
ment officials present.128 The Georgia Antimask Act is too broad to
be applicable only to these narrow situations. Thus, even as a content-
neutral regulation on expression, the Georgia Antimask Statute is
unconstitutional.
b. Equally Effective Alternatives
The Miller court erred in finding that there was no less restrictive
alternative to the Georgia Antimask Act. The court argued that the
restriction was already de minimis. The court attempted to justify this
finding by stating that Miller was still free to engage in all sorts of
expressive activity. 129 He could still carry signs or banners, distribute
leaflets, solicit membership, preach to whoever would listen-provided
that he did not wear a mask while so doing. 130 The court did not
address the fact that a Klan member may be reluctant to engage in
these activities without the protection that anonymity affords.
An outright prohibition on wearing masks is a greater than neces-
sary restriction on free speech rights to further the government inter-
est in preventing masked vigilantes from terrorizing people. There are
equally effective alternatives to an outright ban on masks.1 ' The state
may impose increased penalties on persons committing crimes while
masked.' 3 2 These types of statutes are different in kind from the stat-
utes similar to the Georgia Antimask Act. They are narrowly targeted
at criminals who wear masks to avoid identification while committing
a crime rather than persons who would wear masks to convey a
message. Therefore, statutes that impose greater criminal penalties on
persons who commit crimes while masked do not implicate the first
amendment. This alternative would allow the Klan to hold peaceful
demonstrations while masked, and would also ensure that when the
Klan did commit crimes while masked, the full force of the law would
be at a prosecutor's disposal.
127. While this statement is theoretically true, there are cases which cast doubt on whether
the Supreme Court has rigorously adhered to this standard in practice. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
128. Eg., Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112 (1969); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229, 236 (1963).
129. State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 673, 398 S.E.2d 547, 551 (1990).
130. Id.
131. For a useful compilation of remedies under state and federal law for racially motivated
violence, see generally HoGAN & HARTSON, STRIKING BACK AT BIGoTRY (1986).
132. See supra note 45.
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Another alternative to antimask statutes are statutes that make it a
crime to deprive a person of his or her civil rights. Several federal
statutes criminalize particular activities that deprive others of their
civil rights. 133 Statutes criminalizing the intentional interference with
civil rights are better alternatives to antimask statutes because they
give adequate leeway to first amendment rights, and at the same time
punish persons acting against minorities with criminal intent.
III. CONCLUSION
Antimask statutes are motivated by good intentions-a desire to
protect the population from racial hatred and intimidation. Neverthe-
less, they should be analyzed as content-based restrictions on speech
because they discriminate against certain forms of mask-wearing
expression in favor of others. They are unconstitutional as content-
based restrictions because they do not fall within any of the exceptions
to first amendment protection.
Antimask statutes are also unconstitutional when analyzed as con-
tent-neutral time, place or manner restrictions on expression. They
are not narrowly tailored to meet the government interest in protect-
ing people from mask-wearers who intend to deprive people of their
civil rights. Moreover, there are alternatives that are equally effective,
and do not trample on free speech rights. Therefore, antimask laws
such as Georgia's should be found unconstitutional, and existing laws
should be used to vigorously prosecute people who engage in racially
motivated crime.
Oskar E. Rey
133. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988) (conspiracy to interfere with civil rights; no state action
required); 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988) (deprivation of civil rights under color of law); 18 U.S.C. § 245
(1988) (forcible interference with civil rights; no state action required).
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